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THE COLONIAL DOUBLE BIND:
SOVEREIGNTY AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN INDIAN
COUNTRY
Eric Cheyfitz*
Federal Indian law emerges from the late eighteenth century on-
ward as a corpus that departs distinctively from the central core of
U.S. law. While the latter is grounded, in the first instance, in the
civil rights of the individual, understood in the Lockean sense as hav-
ing a fundamental property in him or herself and thus as always an ac-
tual or potential property holder (the paradigm of property in Locke
being real estate);' the former' impacts in the first instance on the
community, the federally recognized "tribe" or "nation. 4 Thus, since
the foundational Marshall trilogy-Johnson v. M'Intosh,5 Cherokee Na-•6 Jono v. •~t  hrkeN
tion v. Georgia, Worcester v. Georgia'-the central issue of federal In-
dian law has been: sovereignty, the triangulation of power and
authority between the states, the tribes, and the federal govern-
ment-with Congress recognized by the Supreme Court as holding
"plenary power" in this configuration.
The special character of federal Indian law is a result of the his-
torically colonized situation of American Indian communities within
the lower forty-eight states" in combination with the distinct tradi-
Eric Cheyfitz is Clara M. Clendenen Term Professor of English at the University of Penn-
sylvania, and is an adjunct professor in the Law School, where he teaches federal Indian law.
27 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1960).
2 Id. at 32.
3 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1-4307 (2000).
4 See Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968 'Indian Civil Rights'Act, HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 557, 578 (1972):
This tribal orientation has been reinforced by the fact that all of the rights which the
United States reserved to Indians by treaty pertained to the tribes as group entities rather
than to individuals and in light of the conflict with white society over control of group-
owned reservation resources.
5 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (asserting that the Piankeshaw Indians could not grant
valid title to land because they never "owned" it).
6 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (holding that the Cherokee nation is not a foreign state).
7 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (reversing lower court judgment convicting Worcester of be-
ing a white person on Indian land; striking down Georgia's laws redrawing the boundaries of
Indian lands, stating that allowing states to redraw Indian lands is repugnant to the constitution
and the notion of civilization of tribes).
8 See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
9 While both Alaskan and Hawaiian Natives are impacted by certain provisions of federal
Indian law, the significant relationship of Natives to their lands comes under a different legal
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
tional social formations of these communities and their active resis-
tance to assimilation into the social formation of the dominant soci-
ety. l° These traditional social formations can be characterized as
communal, in the sense that their diverse social practices were and
still are in crucial ways carried on through extended kinship relations
to land." These relations are the antithesis of what the West has de-
fined historically as property relations, the relations of a person or
formal association of persons, defined as an individual, to a commod-
ity.' 2 In the antithetical sense I am evokin here, property relations
are quintessentially relations of alienation, whereas traditional kin-
ship relations in this indigenous context are quintessentially recipro-
cal 4 Native land, in a traditional context, is inalienable, whereas
property is defined by its alienability. The central issue of sover-
eignty, then, in federal Indian law is indissolubly tied to the issue of
land, of who defines what land is, both in theory and in practice:
property or the inalienable foundation of the processes of kinship.
Nevertheless, beginning with Talton v. Mayes," formal issues of in-
dividual civil rights began to emerge in conflict with issues of sover-
eignty within tribal communities. While the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Talton affirmed tribal sovereignty in the matter of making
tribal laws over an individual tribal member's federal appeal to con-
stitutional rights, the conflict between sovereignty and individual
rights persisted and intensified. This conflict culminated, in the first
instance, in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), Title I of
which sought to set limits on the sovereignty of tribes over their
agenda than that of the trust relationship which defines the tribal/federal relationship in the
lower forty-eight states. For a discussion of Native Alaskan and Hawaiian rights, see DAVID H.
GETCHES ETAL., CASESAND MATERIALSON FEDERALINDIANILAW905-74 (4th ed. 1998).
10 See generally Eric Cheyfitz, Doctrines of Discovery: The Foundation of Colonialism in Federal In-
dian Law, 2 COMMON-PLACE No. 1 (Oct. 2001), at http://www.common-place.org/vol-02/no-
01/cheyfitz/ (last visitedJan. 22, 2003).
1 See ERIC CHEYF1TZ, The Poetics of Imperialism: Language and Colonization, in "THE TEMPEST"'
TO "TARZAN" 44-58 (Univ. of Pa. Press 1997) (1991).
12 See KEVIN GRAY& SUSAN FRANCIS GRAY, ELEMENTS OF LAND LAW 2-3 (3d ed. 2001):
Nevertheless the consensus view is that the idea of property-particularly in relation to
the all-important commodity of land-plays an indispensable role in the organization of
our social and business life. We can no more contemplate a society without some notion
of property than we can imagine a society which has yet to discover the device of con-
tract. Some theorist have gone even further in underscoring the link between the phe-
nomenon of property and the endorsement of the individual's sense of personal integ-
rity.
The "we" in the previous statement, who cannot "contemplate a society without some notion of
property" is a decidedly Western "we."
Id. at 100-01 ("English property law is accordingly pervaded by a strong bias in favour of
alienability, the common law long regarding alienability as of the essence of property in land.").
14 See CHEYFrTL, supra note 11, at 54-55.
15 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding that the murder of a Cherokee Indian by another member
of the tribe, within tribal territory, does not constitute an offense against the United States).
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members, thus modifying Talton.16 In the second instance, however,
the conflict culminated in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez," which, cit-
ing Talton as precedent,' 8 argued tribal sovereignty's precedence over
civil rights, except in the case of habeas corpus appeals to federal
courts sanctioned under 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (ICRA), although in this
case Martinez makes it clear that the respondent is not the tribe but
the individual tribal official holding the prisoner. 9 Thus, today, the
ten constitutional rights of Indians in their tribes, as enumerated in
25 U.S.C. § 1302, come under the sole authority of tribal courts; and
the tribes are protected from federal lawsuits in this area through the
principle of "sovereign immunity," ° which the Martinez decision reas-
serts.
2
We should not assume that this situation is stable, however. In
fact, because of the conflict created between the plenary power of
Congress and the limited political autonomy of the tribes, stemming
from Worcester, the language in Talton is ambiguous (increasingly so, lr1 • ,,\22
in the present federal policy context of tribal "self-determination") ,
asserting that the tribal powers under consideration "are local powers
not created by the constitution, although subject to its general provi-
sions and the paramount authority of congress. 23  The ambiguity
here resides in the question of what exactly are the "general provi-
sions" of the Constitution, if not, in significant part, a guarantee of
certain individual civil rights, uniformly applied in local situations
16 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2000). For a history of the Indian Civil Rights Act, see generally
Burnett, supra note 4.
17 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
18 Id. at 56.
19 Id. at 59.
20 For a comprehensive discussion of the issue of "sovereign immunity," see GETCHES, supra
note 9, at 383-88. The fundamental principle of "sovereign immunity" is stated in Kiowa Tribe of
Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998): "As a matter of federal law, a
tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its
immunity."
21 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59 ("In the absence here of any unequivocal
expression of contrary legislative intent, we conclude that suits against the tribe under the ICRA
are barred by its sovereign immunity from suit.").
See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b)
(2000):
The Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of the Federal Government's
unique and continuing relationship with, and responsibility to, individual Indian tribes
and to the Indian people as a whole through the establishment of a meaningful Indian
self-determination policy which will permit an orderly transition from the Federal domi-
nation of programs for, and services to, Indians to effective and meaningful participation
by the Indian people in the planning, conduct, and administration of those programs
and services. In accordance with this policy, the United States is committed to support-
ing and assisting Indian tribes in the development of strong and stable tribal govern-
ments, capable of administering quality programs and developing the economies of their
respective communities.
23 Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382 (1896) (emphasis added).
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under the Fourteenth Amendment, one of which rights, habeas cor-
pus, the Court denied the appellant in Talton.24 The legal ambiguity
is generated by the colonial situation, in which the Constitution is at
once "paramount" over the tribes (being the basis in the Commerce
Clause for congressional plenary power)- and yet diminished within
them, in the tribes' relations to their members. This ambiguity wit-
nesses the fact that in the attempted legal division of authority be-
tween the tribe's internal political autonomy and its external political
dependency on the federal government, the boundary between the
"internal" and the "external" inevitably blurs.
The historic emergence of this conflict between rights and sover-
eignty is a result of a historic tension, or gap, between modern tribal
governments and their constituents, witnessed today in conflicts such
as those of: the Grass Roots Oglala Lakota Oyate with the Pine Ridge
tribal council;26 the Black with the Blood Seminoles; 27 and the Navajo-
Hopi Land Dispute. 2' The origin of such rifts was produced by the
24 Id. at 379.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. gives Congress the power "[tio regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Chief Justice Mar-
shall's interpretation of this clause in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia grounds his generative definition
of Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations." 30 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1831). But see Justice
Thompson's dissent, in which he criticizes Marshall's interpretation of the Commerce Clause as
"a mere verbal criticism," which cannot support the conclusion that "Indian tribes are not for-
eign nations." Id. at 62 (Thompson,J., dissenting).
According to a chronology on the Grass Roots Oyate website, on "January 16th, 2000:
Grass Roots Oyate took peaceful control of the Red Cloud Building, tribal administrative offices
of the Oglala Sioux Tribe (OST)." Chronology-The Awakening of Our Tribe, at http://www.
fireonprairie.org/Oglala%20takeover%20chronology.html (updated Feb. 27, 2000) (last visited
Jan. 22, 2003). The "[m]ost important demands," listed on this site, included "referendum vote
to abolish I.R.A. government formulation of self-governance system." Id.
In their "Official Proclamation" the Oyate urge the abolishment of the IRA system of tribal
government and its replacement by the traditional system. Grass Roots Oglala Lakota Oyate,
Official Proclamation, available at http://www.ouachitalk.com/proclamation.htm (last visited
Oct. 23, 2002) [hereinafter "Official Proclamation"]. The language of the "Official Proclama-
tion" is worth noting in that it links the sovereignty of the people to their "human rights," as-
serting that "the sovereignty of our Oyate lies within the individuals of each Tiwahe [family]."
Id. What this language does is try to salvage the notions of "sovereignty" and "rights" from the
system of federal Indian law, where they are opposed, and translate them to a traditional order,
where they are linked. The notion of tradition I reference here is not to some unchanging past
but to a dynamic history of resistance. In this case, the Oyate are making their appeal to "the
United Nations Security Council, the General Assembly, and Human Rights Commissioner to
monitor and oversee the orderly transfer of power and authority back to the people." Id. The
rejection of U.S. federal Indian law is predicated on an appeal to international law.
27 For a brief interpretation of the history of the Black and Blood Seminole conflict see
Brent Staples, The Seminole Tribe, Running from History, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2002, Editorial at 12.
What we have here is a federally constituted tribal council trying to exclude part of the historic
tribe from a tribal windfall by using blood quantum measures, developed in the late nineteenth
century by the federal government to gain control of Indian identity and after 1934 employed
by the tribes to control membership in a field of limited federal benefits.
See infra Part II.
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colonial situation, which forced a shift in Indian communities from a
decentralized consensual mode of governance, where a class of gov-
erned and a class of governors did not exist, to a representational
mode, where political conflict and political action within the com-
munity became mediated in a radically different way, characterized by
the notion of majority rule operating through hierarchical, central-
ized institutions answerable to the federal government. We could
trace this shift, from consensus to representation, back at least as far
as the emergence of the Cherokee nation in late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century culminating in the incorporation of the Chero-
kee constitution in 1827. This emergence produced divisions within
Cherokee communities where what came to be called, in a reductive
Western terminology, "traditionalists," (or "conservatives") and "pro-
gressives" conflicted over strategies for dealing with U.S. power. Tra-
ditionalists typically favored oppositional strategies, while progressives
typically favored adaptive strategies; however, when applied to tribal
politics categories such as "conservative" and "progressive" are bound
to miss the trans-categorical nuances of kinship ties that make analyz-
ing these politics a difficult business for non-tribal persons.3O
Since 1787 such conflicts were a direct result of the colonization
of Indian communities by the federal government, the formation of
what 18 U.S.C. § 1151 terms "Indian Country," which includes:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of
any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through 
the same.31
29 See Burnett, supra note 4, at 578:
The traditional lack in most tribes of established social classes further cements tribal ties
since there are fewer sources of localized power and sub-group disaffection... The so-
cial adhesive in the tribal systems appears to have been the collective manner in which
decisions were made-community consent was required before the council would act.
30 For a history of the shift from traditional modes of governance to representational modes
among the Cherokees, with the concomitant development of "conservative" and "progressive"
factions, see JAMES MOONEY, MYrHS OFTHE CHEROKEE 83, 88, 101-114 (Dover 1995) (1900). It
should be noted that, based on a traditional notion of land as inalienable, opposition to re-
moval in the wake of the Indian Removal Act of 1831 cut across factional divisions. As Moody
notes in his description of the development of representational government among the Chero-
kees: "[i]t was made treason, punishable with death, for any individual to negotiate the sale of
lands to the whites without the consent of the national council." Id. at 107. While the Chero-
kees had since the end of the eighteenth century been forced to alienate their lands in treaties
with the U.S., what this 1820 law demonstrates is a continuing resistance to the idea of land as
property.
31 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2002).
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Beginning in 1790 with the first Trade and Intercourse Act, which
gave the federal government crucial power over the sale of Indian
lands (implying that colonial power meant the power to translate the
Indian reciprocal relation to land into property relations), the gov-
ernment began to elaborate a legal and administrative structure with
Congress at its apex within which conquered Indian communities
were compelled to operate. Without congressional authorization
Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, created the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs (BIA) in 1824,"3 under the Department of War. Congress
authorized a commissioner of Indian affairs in 1832.3 When Con-
gress established the Department of the Interior in 1849, it shifted
the BIA to Interior.3 The development of a reservation system, ad-
ministered by the BIA, for concentrating, containing, and "civilizing"
the Indians (to use the language of Indian Commissioner Lea in
1851)3 began immediately thereafter. 7
At the same time that the government was articulating the colo-
nial administrative structure of Indian country, the Supreme Court
was in the process of supplying this structure with its legal footings, its
foundation in the Marshall trilogy. Johnson v. M'Intosh, in one mo-
tion, imposed the Western concept of title on Native common land
and transferred that title to the federal government, affirming the
displacement of Native reciprocity by property.3 Cherokee Nation v.
32 Trade and Intercourse Act, 1 Stat. 137, § 4 (1790) reprinted in DOCUMENIS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY 14-15 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter U.S. INDIAN
POLICY].
Creation of a Bureau of Indian Affairs in the War Department, H.R. DOC. NO. 146, at 6
(1824), reprinted in U.S. INDIAN POLICY, supra note 32, at 37-38.
M Authorization of a Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 4 Stat. 564 (1832) reprinted in U.S.
INDIAN POLICY, supra note 32, at 62.
9Z Transfer of Indian Affairs to the Department of the Interior, 9 Stat. 395 (1849) reprinted in
U.S. INDIAN POLICY, supra note 32, at 79-80.
96 Indian Commissioner Lea on the Civilization of the Indians, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 2, at
273-74 (1851), reprinted in U.S. INDIAN POLICY, supra note 32, at 85-86.
37 See Commissioner of Indian Affairs Mix, in FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
15 (William S. Hein Co. 1988) (1941) ("The policy of concentrating the Indians on small reser-
vations of land, and sustaining them there for a limited period, until they can be induced to
make the necessary exertions to support themselves, was commenced in 1853, with those in
California.").
See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) and id. at 603, for example,
both of which inscribe Indian lands within the rubric of title.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no
instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired.
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just
claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their
rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and
their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was de-
nied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those
who made it.
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Georgia defined the relationship of the tribes to the federal govern-
ment as "domestic dependent nations," with an emphasis on depend-
ency in Marshall's metaphor of "pupilage" (of "ward" to "guardian")
to describe this relationship. 9 And Worcester v. Georgia gave the fed-
eral government preeminence over the states in Indian affairs, reserv-
ing for the tribes what were at that time certain undefined powers of
internal self-government in a situation where their sovereignty was al-
ready severely compromised.40
As we know, colonialism coerces collaboration between emergent
Native elites and the colonial power. In the case of North American
Indians, the colonial situation produces these elites from what were
egalitarian kinship-based societies governed, as noted, by group-wide
consensus. Through complex political and social processes of accul-
turation, including gaining literacy in the English language often
through intermarriage, and not without a certain degree of commu-
nity support (however ambivalent or resistant), certain groups within
the tribes positioned themselves to mediate between the federal gov-
ernment and their communities for essential goods and services.
Until 1871, when Congress interdicted the making of further treaties
with Indian tribes,42 this mediation was conducted under the repre-
sentative structure of the treaty apparatus, where leaders acceptable
to the colonial power negotiated what was increasingly a form of sur-
render to the federal government. From 1871 until 1934, the time of
the Wheeler-Howard, or Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) , the BIA
was instrumental in imposing or attempting to impose Native gov-
ernments. From 1934 onward, tribes, out of necessity of dealing with
the federal government's bureaucratic control of Indian country,
Id. at 574. "It has never been contended, that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their
right of possession has never been questioned. The claim of government extends to the com-
plete ultimate title, charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquir-
ing that right." Id. at 603. For an analysis of the way Johnson translates Indian notions of com-
mon land into the Western idea of property, see Eric Cheyfitz, Savage Law: The Plot Against
American Indians in Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh and The Pioneers, in THE CULTURES OF
U.S. IMPERIALISM (Donald Pease & Amy Kaplan eds., 1993). For an analysis of the history of the
term property and its power in colonial encounters from 1492 to the present, see generally
CHEVFITI, supra note 10.
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
40 See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832):
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress. The whole in-
tercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws,
vested in the government of the United States.
41 See generally MOONEY, supra note 30 (discussing adaptive processes among Cherokees).
42 See Act of Mar. 3, 1971, 16 Stat. 566 (March 3, 1871), reprinted in 1 'INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS
AND TREATIES 8 (CharlesJ. Kappler ed., AMS Press 1971) (1904).
43 Indian Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
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adopted Western style constitutions or, refusing such constitutions,
similar representative structures, typified by an elected tribal council,
headed by a chair or responsible to a president.
It is within this history of colonialism, understood as a history of
displacements (of consensus by representation, of kinship by indi-
vidualism, of communal land by property) that the emergence of the
conflict between sovereignty and civil rights in Indian country must
be understood. I should emphasize here that by "history of dis-
placements" I understand an ongoing process of conflict in which
one set of terms (representation, individualism, property) has not effaced
the other (consensus, kinship, communal land) but remains in conflict
with it. This remains true however disproportionate the power of the
Western legal vocabulary, founded on property and individualism, may
be. It is within the confines of this vocabulary, and this is the colonial
nexus, that the terms sovereignty and civil rights are generated-and this
is crucial-as antagonistic terms. For there is no necessary reason, out-
side of a particular history, that these terms should be in opposition.
In fact in other histories we might imagine, U.S. history, for example,
they could be understood as mutually supportive, even synonymous.
I am thinking here, for example, of a notion like sovereignty of the indi-
vidual."
What produces these antagonistic terms, as in federal Indian law,
is a certain fiction of the inside and the outside, of pre- and post-
contact, embedded in the legal arguments of Talton and Martinez, in
which sovereignty is read as an indigenous concept of Native societies
pre-dating the U.S. Constitution, whereas the concept of civil rights is
understood as alien to these societies, and a later imposition of West-
ern law. Thus, in arguing for the containment of civil rights by tribal
forums, the Martinez decision asserts:
By not exposing tribal officials to the full array of federal remedies avail-
able to redress actions of federal and state officials, Congress may also
have considered that resolution of statutory issues under [25 U.S.C.]
§ 1302, and particularly those issues likely to arise in a civil context, will
frequently depend on questions of tribal tradition and custom which
tribal forums may be in a better position to evaluate than federal
courts .... Although we early rejected the notion that Indian tribes are
"foreign states" for jurisdictional purposes ... we have also recognized
that the tribes remain quasi-sovereign nations which, by government
structure, culture, and source of sovereignty are in many ways foreign to the
constitutional institutions of the Federal and State Governments. As is
suggested by the District Court's opinion in this case, efforts by the fed-
eral judiciary to apply statutory prohibitions of [section] 1302 in a civil
44 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71-72 (1978) (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted).
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context may substantially interfere with a tribe's ability to maintain itself
as a culturally and politically distinct entity.45
As in the passage just cited, the structural function of the fiction
of the inside and the outside (of pre- and post-contact, of the indige-
nous and the foreign) in federal Indian law is to repress the colonial
context of this law even as it articulates it. The key term sovereignty
does this work neatly, emphasizing here the independence of Indian
communities in the pre-contact period but simultaneously referring
implicitly to the sovereignty of invading Western nation states over In-
dian communities, which reduces their implied pre-contact sover-
eignty, their sovereignty from a different "source," to a "quasi-
sovereign [ty]." The term sovereignty serves to homogenize and syn-
chronize, indeed harmonize, these two heterogeneous, diachronic,
and conflictive moments, pre- and post-contact. It does this by in-
sinuating that the term itself, sovereignty, is part of both a pre-contact
Native discourse and a Western legal discourse when, in fact, it is
solely a production of the latter, first imposed on and then adopted
and adapted by Native communities in their ongoing conflicts with
and within Western law.4 In Worcester Chief Justice Marshall recog-
nized the terminological issue without elaborating it:
The words "treaty" and "nation," are words of our own language, selected
in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a
definite and well-understood meaning. We have applied them to Indi-
ans, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth; they are
47
applied to all in the same sense.
The term sovereignty is bound in a historical and cultural syntax to
the Western legal terms treaty and nation, a syntax that is itself
grounded in the terms of property. The Cherokees were the first tribe
to use these terms and this syntax before the Supreme Court, where
their right to use it in the fullest sense was denied, an irony that Mar-
shall does not note in his later decision in Worcester, which seems to
recognize in some of its dicta the very sovereignty refused in Cherokee
Nation. If the term sovereignty has any translations in pre-contact In-
45 Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
46 See supra notes 25 and 41 and accompanying text. I will also discuss such an adaptation by
grass roots Navajos in the second part of this essay.
48 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832) (emphasis added).
See id. Here is the full context of the quote given above in Worcester, supra note 9. The
dictum could constitute an argument for full sovereignty:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent, political com-
munities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil,
from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible
power .... The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people dis-
tinct from others." The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those
to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous
treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently, admits their rank among those pow-
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dian vocabularies, we can be sure that these translations are antitheti-
cal to Western uses of the term, based, as these uses are, in the syntax
of land as property. And it is these uses of sovereignty, and only these
uses, that federal Indian law recognizes.
Contrary to Martinez, then, sovereignty and civil rights are not op-
posed terms, one guaranteeing, the other usurping, Indian auton-
omy. They are, rather, complexly linked terms functioning in con-
cert as part of the same hegemonic, colonial discourse. Within this
discourse, where federal Indian law has generated not only conflicts
between Indian tribes and the federal government but as an intimate
part of these conflicts inter and intra tribal conflicts as well, the fed-
eral enforcement of civil rights (for enforcement and rights cannot
be separated as Justice White points out in his dissent in Martinez)49
could, if it were in effect, both threaten and support Indian sover-
ers who are capable of making treaties. The words "treaty" and "nation" are words of our
own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, hav-
ing each a definite and well-understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as
we have applied them to the other nations of the earth; they are applied to all in the
same sense.
Id. at 559-560. Further, Marshall's reasoning in Worcester that "the settled doctrine of the law of
nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence-its right to self-
government-by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection" paraphrases the argu-
ment that Justice Thompson uses in his dissent in Cherokee Nation, when he defines a foreign
nation. Id. at 56061. See also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 53 (1831). It re-
mains for Justice McLean in a concurring opinion in Worcester to state explicitly, referring to
Cherokee Nation, that the Cherokees are a state but not a foreign one:
At no time has the sovereignty of the country been recognised as existing in the Indians,
but they have been always admitted to possess many of the attributes of sovereignty. All
the rights which belong to self-government have been recognised as vested in them.
Their right of occupancy has never been questioned, but the fee in the soil has been
considered in the government. This may be called the right to the ultimate domain, but
the Indians have a present right of possession .... It must be admitted, that the Indians
sustain a peculiar relation to the United States. They do not constitute, as was decided at
the last term, a foreign state ... and yet, having the right of self-government, they, in
some sense, form a state. In the management of their internal concerns, they are de-
pendent on no power. They punish offences, under their own laws, and in doing so,
they are responsible to no earthly tribunal. They make war, and form treaties of peace.
The exercise of these and other powers, gives to them a distinct character as a people,
and constitutes them, in some respects, a state, although they may not be admitted to
possess the right of soil.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 580-81 (McLean, J., concurring). It would seem then that the line between
being a state and a fully sovereign, or foreign, state is precisely the line between property and
mere possession.
49 See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 83 (White,J, dissenting):
The extension of constitutional rights to individual citizens is intended to intrude upon
the authority of government. And once it has been decided that an individual does pos-
sess certain rights vis-A-vis his government, it necessarily follows that he has some way to
enforce those rights. Although creating a federal cause of action may "constitut[e] an
interference with tribal autonomy and self-government beyond that created by the
change in substantive law itself," in my mind it is a further step that must be taken; oth-
erwise, the change in the law may be meaningless.
(emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
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eignty at the same time in the same place. This is the double bind of
the colonial situation of Indian country, as my analysis of the Navajo-
Hopi Land Dispute, for example, will point out. It is also worth re-
membering in working out the historical calculus of sovereignty and
civil rights in Indian country that in the beginning of the establish-
ment of federal Indian law, at the same time that the Cherokees were
pursuing their treaty rights under the legal terminology of sover-
eignty, the Pequot writer and activist William Apess was pursuing, un-
der the legal terminology of civil rights, the sovereignty claims of the
Marshpee tribe in its struggle with Massachusetts for autonomy.50
The historic seesawing back and forth between sovereignty and civil
rights that we see from Talton to Martinez occludes the complex legal-
historical relationship of these two subject matters and in doing so in-
sures the continuance of the colonial status quo, which inevitably pits
Indians against Indians in agonistic discourses grounded in the lan-
guage of both sovereignty and civil rights.
II.
The Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute, which has been characterized as
"the greatest title problem of the West,"" began in 1882, when an ex-
ecutive order issued by President Chester A. Arthur designated as a
reservation 2,500,000 acres of land encompassing the three mesas in
northeastern Arizona on which the Hopi tribe had lived from pre-
contact times. Because Navajos and Hopis have had a long history of
cultural contact-including intermarriage, and trading, as well as
conflicts from time to time particularly as a result of pressures gener-
ated by European invasions of the area including: first, Spanish; then,
Mexican; and, finally, Anglo -there were by government estimates,not surprisingly, 300 Navajos living within the boundaries of the 1882
50 See generally WILLIAM APESS, Indian Nullification of the Unconstitutional Laws of Massachusetts
Relative to the Marshpee Tribe; or, The Pretended Riot Explained, in ON OUR OWN GROUND: THE
COMPLETE WRITINGS OF WILLIAM APESS, A PEQUOT (Barry O'Connell ed., Univ. of Mass. Press
1992) (1835). Apess recounts the beginnings of his relationship with the Marshpees in the fol-
lowing terms:
Then, wishing to know more of their grievances, real or supposed, and upon their invita-
tion, I appointed several meetings; for I was requested to hear their whole story and to
help them. I therefore appointed the twenty-first of May, 1833, to attend a council to be
called by my brethren. In the meanwhile I went to Falmouth, nine miles distant, where I
held forth upon the civil and religious rights of the Indians.
Id. at 173. And in the Resolution issued by the Marshpees, we find: "Resolved, That we, as a tribe,
will rule ourselves, and have the right to do so; for all men are born free and equal, says the
Constitution of the country." Id. at 175. Thus, Marshpee sovereignty is declared in the lan-
guage of U.S. civil rights.
51 Healing v.Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 129 (D. Ariz. 1962).
52 See DAVID M. BRUGGE, THE NAVAJO-HOPI LAND DISPUTE: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 3-23
(1994).
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reservation at the time of the executive order,53 which not only in-
cluded the Hopis but "such other Indians as the Secretary of the Inte-
rior may see fit to settle thereon."" Eighty years later, the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona in its decision in Heal-
ing v. Jones determined that these "other Indians" were Navajos resid-
ing on the 1882 reservation:
The evidence is overwhelming that Navajo Indians used and occupied
parts of the 1882 reservation, in Indian fashion, as their continuing and
permanent area of residence, from long prior to the creation of the res-
ervation in 1882 toJuly 22, 1958, when any rights which any Indians had
acquired in the reservation became vested.
The Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute, generated by the creation of this res-
ervation, has of this moment a 120-year ongoing history, which I have
detailed and analyzed elsewhere."' Preceding my own work there is a
significant, though by no means homogeneous, historical literatureS 57
on the Dispute.
53 See Healing, 210 F. Supp. at 145. See also JOHN REDHOUSE, GEOPOLITICS OF THE NAVAJO
HOPI LAND DISPUTE 5 (1985). Redhouse estimates the number of Navajos living within the
1882 Reservation as between 300-600. In a personal communication, Bill Sebastian of the
Northern Arizona Indigenous Peoples Legal Defense Fund remarks:
The often quoted statistic of a population of 300-600 that increased to 9,000, 15,000 by
the 1950s should be considered carefully, as it plays into the Hopi contention in Healing
v. Jones [210 F. Supp. 125] of a massive influx of Navajo after creation of the reservation.
While some migration did occur, the 30 fold increase may result more from increasingly
accurate population measurements as the involvement of government officials in the
area increased. The BIA's activities up through 1882 were almost exclusively focused on
the Hopi settlements, and no one made any type of systematic effort to collect such in-
formation from the Dineh [Navajo]-occupied lands.
Letter from Bill Sebastian, Northern Arizona Indigenous Peoples Legal Defense Fund, to Eric
Cheyfitz, University of Pennsylvania (undated) (on file with author). Because of their concen-
trated settlement patterns in fixed villages, it certainly would have been easier to gather demo-
graphic information on the Hopis than on the Navajos, whose traditional settlement patterns
were dispersed. We also should note that in 1882 the western boundary of the Navajo reserva-
tion, created in 1868, was contiguous with most of the eastern boundary of the 1882 reservation,
and that given the interaction of the two peoples over hundreds of years, we could expect Na-
vajo settlements around the three Hopi mesas.
Healing, 210 F. Supp. at 129.55
Id. at 144-45. The Healing court also recognized the long historical Navajo occupancy of
the lands constituting the 1882 reservation, and determined that the Secretary of the Interior
had officially settled these "other Indians" there between 1931 and 1937, and that by extension
the Navajos as a tribe had vested rights in the reservation. Id at 169-70.
See generally Eric Cheyfitz, The Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute: A Brief History, in 2 INTERVENTIONS
248 (2000) [hereinafter A Brief History]; see also Eric Cheyfitz, Theory and Practice. The Case of the
Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute, 10 J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y& L. 619 (2002) [hereinafter Theory and Prac-
tice5. See generally, e.g., EMILY BENEDEK, THE WIND WON'T KNOW ME: A HISTORY OF THE NAVAJO-
HOPI LAND DISPUrE (1992) (discussing the actors in the dispute); see also generally BRUGGE, supra
note 52; CATI-IFINE FEHER-ELSTON, CHILDREN OF THE SACRED GROUND: AMERICA'S LAST INDIAN
WAR (1988);JERRY KAMMER, THE SECOND LONG WAIK THE NAVAJO-HOPI LAND DISPUTE (1980);
REDHOUSE, supra note 53 (documenting the role of energy interests in the dispute); CHARLES
WILKINSON, FIRE ON THE PLATEAU: CONFLICT AND ENDURANCE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST
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What my reading of the legal, historical, and ethnographic litera-
tures germane to the Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute suggests is that the
name of the Dispute itself is a misnomer, implying a clearly antago-
nistic relationship between Navajos and Hopis that pre-dates the co-
lonial intervention of the U.S government in their lives.8 In fact,
what prompted the executive order that established the 1882 reserva-
tion was not Navajo-Hopi conflict but resistance by Hopi traditional-
ists to the forced removal of Hopi children to government boarding
schools.59 What developed after the court cases began in 1959 was
not, then, part of an ongoing conflict between the Hopi and the Na-
vajo people but a conflict between tribal councils, often hard to dif-
ferentiate from collaboration or collusion,6' in which traditional Hopi
leaders (Kikmongwis) joined traditional Navajos to resist the coun-
cils' conversion of sacred land into property.6' Notions of a national,
or tribal; sovereignty among the Navajos and Hopis predating the
U.S. imposition of tribal councils on the two peoples in the twentieth-
century badly misrepresents social structures that were neither tribal
nor national but based on matrilineal clans crisscrossing decentral-
ized villages (at Hopi) and dispersed bands (at Navajo).62
(1999) (discussing the current social and environmental situation on the Colorado plateau);
Indian Law Resource Center, Report to the Hopi Kikmongwis and Other Traditional Hopi Leaders on
Docket 196 and the Continuing Threat to Hopi Land and Sovereignty (Washington, D.C., March 1979)
[hereinafter Kikmongwis].
58 See A Brief Histoiy, supra note 56, at 252-53; Theory and Practice, supra note 56, at 110.
See A Brief History, supra note 56, at 258-60. The 1882 reservation emerged from com-
plaints to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs by the agent at Hopi, J.H. Fleming, that two An-
glos, who lived among the Hopis, were obstructing his attempts to "civilize" the Indians by help-
ing them resist Fleming's attempts to send their children to Christian and government
boarding schools. Until the President issued his executive order, the Hopi lands were public
lands and Fleming had no authority to evict the Anglos, E.S. Merritt and Dr. Jeremiah Sullivan,
who had been employees of the Hopi agency under Fleming's predecessor.
See REDHOUSE, supra note 53, at 11 (detailing the cozy relationship between the Hopi law-
yer John Boyden, the Navajo lawyer Norman Littell, and the tribal councils leading up to the
Healing v. Jones case). In sum, Littell convinced the Navajo tribal council to pass two resolutions
in aid of financing the Hopi suit against the Navajos. Congress rejected both resolutions, but
they suggest the "friendly" nature of the suit once it was filed.
See Kikmongwis, supra note 57, at 171-74. Prior to, and in the wake of the Relocation Act,
traditional Navajo and Hopi leaders formed a joint resistance. See Relocation Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 640 (1950), repealed by Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-531, 88 Stat.
1712, § 26, 25 U.S.C. § 640d (1974) [hereinafter Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act].
62 See MISCHA T1TIEV, OLD ORAIBI: A STUDY OF THE HOPI INDIANS OF THIRD MESA 67 (Univ.
of N.M. Press 1992) (1944):
Each Village chief's jurisdiction is strictly limited to his own pueblo; there is no recurrent
occasion when all the village chiefs meet together; and there is no such thing as a tribal
council. Politically speaking, the Hopi can hardly be called a tribe, and apart from their
participation in the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, there is no record of a co-operative action
embracing all the Hopi towns.
See also David Wilkins, Governance within the Navajo Nation: Have Democratic Traditions Taken
Hold?, 17 WICAZO SA REVIEW 91, 129 (2002):
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The case-law literature on the Dispute began in 1959 with the start
of the generative Healing v. Jones case, brought pursuant to a con-
gressional act waiving the sovereign immunity of both tribes so that
they could sue each other in federal court to determine property
rights in the 1882 reservation.64 At the time, the government esti-
mates of Navajos living there "exceeded eighty-eight hundred,"6 then
more than twice the entire Hopi population." The case, generated
and argued by two Anglo lawyers, Norman Littell for the Navajos and
John Boyden for the Hopis, under pressure from Peabody Coal to de-
termine subsurface rights on the reservation, resulted in the creation
of the Hopi Reservation from 650,013 acres at the southern end of
the 1882 reservation, while the remainder of the 1882 reservation was
designated for shared use by the two tribes, an area subsequently
known as the Joint Use Area (JUA).67 The mineral rights remained
equally vested in the two tribes,68 where they had been since an Inte-
rior Department ruling in 1946.
However, the Hopi tribal council, which was represented by Boy-
den (who was also retained by Peabody Coal-a conflict of interest
revealed after his death in 1980),09 was not satisfied with the decision
and pursued a partition of the JUA in both the courts and Congress.
70
Official Hopi pressure paid off in 1974 with the passage of Public Law
93-531, which mandated partition through federal mediation, and• • 71
failing that, through court order. Given the agonistic structure of
the Dispute generated by the federal government, the tribal govern-
ments, the lawyers, and the mineral interests, it is not surprising that
mediation failed. Consequently, in February 1977, the Federal Dis-
From a Western European political perspective, the Navajo Nation was nonexistent as a
representative political body until the 1920s. The Navajo people were, of course, cohe-
sive in that they had a common linguistic and cultural heritage, lived within a well-
defined territory, and referred to themselves as Din6. But their political organization, in
general, did not extend beyond local bands that were led by head-men, or nataanii.
Unfortunately, Wilkins's essay does not take into account the matrilineal, matrifocal clan struc-
ture at Navajo, in which women play the central part, so while his general characterization of
traditional Navajo governance as decentralized in bands is accurate, he gives the impression
that this governance is patriarchal in structure, which couldn't be farther from the truth. See
generally GARY WITHERSPOON, NAVAJO KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE (1975). For a description of mat-
rilineal, matrifocal kinship at Hopi, see TITIEV, supra, at 7-58.
63 See Healing v.Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ariz. 1962).
64 See id. at 129-30.
65 Id. at 145.
66 See BENEDEK, supra note 57, at 154 (stating the Hopi population in the area at the time to
be 3,700).
67 See Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act, supra note 61.
68 See A Brief History, supra note 56, at 260-62 (discussing the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement
Act).
60 See WILKINSON, supra note 57, at 298-300.
70 See A Brief History, supra note 56, at 263.
71 Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act, supra note 61, at §§ 1 (a), 4(a).
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trict Court of Arizona drew a line partitioning the JUA into what are
known as the Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL) and the Navajo Parti-
tioned Lands (NPL). The principle of partition, that "where feasi-
ble... [the partitioned lands] be contiguous to the reservation of
each... tribe,"72 left 100 Hopis but 15,000-17,000 Navajos on the
wrong side of the line. 71 Public Law 93-531 "recommend[ed]
that... there be undertaken a program of relocation of members of
one tribe from lands which may be partitioned to the other tribe in
the joint use area."74 To date, 12,000-14,000 HPL Navajos have been
relocated from their traditional homelands on the HPL7 5 with devas-
tating results. Charles Wilkinson, a Hopi partisan, sums up the hu-
man cost of relocation:
Relocation, which still had not been completed by the late 1990s,
brought protracted agony to the affected Indian people on Black Mesa.
Most of these have been elderly, traditional people and, for both Navajo
and Hopi, their land was sacred. For many, it was the only land they had
ever known. Health specialists agreed that the stress of removal would be
overwhelming, leading to disorientation, sickness, depression, even early
death. Still, the relocation program has marched on. Some resisters,
most notably Navaos near Big Mountain in north central Black Mesa,
simply will not go.
The number of relocatees on both sides tell us what the Wilkinson
quote erases: that the social devastation of relocation fell and still falls
overwhelmingly on Navajos. 7
Since 1977 and the relocation mandate, the Land Dispute has
generated further legal action. In 1988 the case of Manybeads v.
United States was brought by forty-seven HPL Navajos who claimed, in
the first instance (among seven assertions), that their First Amend-
ment right to religious freedom (and by extension the rights of all
72 Id. at § 6(e).
For a discussion of population figures on the HPL see A Brief History, supra note 56, at
endnote 9.
74 Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act, supra note 61, at § 5(a) (3).
75 See A Brief History, supra note 56 (analyzing population figures). Navajo Nation Council
Resolution CF-19-97 (Feb. 7, 1997) gives the number of HPL Navajos relocated as "[m]ore than
12,400... (2,815 families) .... " This uses a coefficient of 4.4 people per family, which, as I
explain in the reference noted above, is conservative, given the extended family structure of
Navajo families. In its summary of the Land Dispute, the Ninth Circuit noted in Clinton v. Bab-
bitt that "[als of 1996, the United States had spent more than $330 million to relocate more
than 11,000 tribal members." Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 1999).
76 WILKINSON, supra note 57, at 290.
As my published research on the Land Dispute attests, see A Brief History, supra note 56, I
have, since 1997, been working with a group of HPL Navajos on Big Mountain on matters of
community organization. The Navajo community organizers with whom I work have been using
traditional methods of consensus building to try and overcome the agonistic structure that the
Dispute has imposed both within the Navajo community fractured by the Dispute and between
HPL Navajos and the Hopi tribe.
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HPL Navajos) were being violated by the relocation mandate stem-
ming from Public Law 93-531. 7 This is because in traditional Navajo
practice, as is generally true for Native Americans, land and religion
are inseparably linked.7' Initially filed in United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, the case was transferred to the Federal
District Court of Arizona in Phoenix, where Judge Earl Carroll re-
jected all the claims, four of which were directly linked to the First
Amendment argument"O0 In dismissing this argument, Carroll cited
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, to the effect that
81government property rights trumped Indian religious rights.
In 1991 Manybeads was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which man-
dated a mediation procedure between the interested parties (HPL
Navajos, the Navajo Nation, the Hopi Tribe, and the United States) to
arrive at a resolution of the relocation crisis. The result of the media-
tion, which lasted four years" and was, to say the least, a highly vexed
process,83 was Public Law 104-301, the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement
Act of 1996.'" Folded into this act is a document known as the Ac-
commodation Agreement (AA),85 which spells out the conditions un-
der which the 2,000-3,000 Navajos remaining on the HPL could con-
tinue to reside there." The AA constitutes the current status quo for
the Navajos on the HPL. 7 Fundamental to this status quo are two
78 730 F. Supp. 1515, 1516-17 (D. Ariz. 1989). For a discussion of this case, see A Brief His-
tory, supra note 56.
7,) See Navajo Nation Council Resolution CD-107-94 (Dec. 13, 1994):
This religion, Beauty WNay of Life, holds this land sacred and that we, the Navajo People,
must always care for it. Through this sacred covenant, this sacred ancestral homeland is
the home and hogan of all Navajo people. Further, if the Navajo left their homelands,
all prayers and religion would be ineffective and lost forever.
80 See Manybeads, 730 F. Supp. at 1516-20.
81 Id. at 1517 (citing Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)).
82 See Letter from Lee Brooke Phillips to Ferrel H. Secakuku, October 2, 1995, in the Ac-
commodation Agreement; see infra notes 84 and 85 and related text.
83 See A Brief History, supra note 56, at 270. The HPL Navajos were represented in the mediat-
ing process by a group known as Dine Dayikah Ada Yalti (DDAY). This group was represented
by Lee Brook Phillips, the lawyer who prepared and argued the Manybeads case. By the time the
mediation was over, there was significant dissension among the HPL Navajos over this represen-
tation and splinter groups formed, some of whom retained other attorneys. After the media-
tion ended and PL 104-301 was enacted, DDAY, with the sanction of the Navajo Nation, contin-
ued to represent the HPL Navajos in negotiations with the Hopi Tribe but dissension continues
and the community organizers with whom I consult are working toward forming a new repre-
sentative structure, one which is endorsed by the whole community.
84 The Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute Settlement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-301, 110 Stat.
3649 (1996), 25 U.S.C. § 640d note (2000).
85 Id. at§ 2 (3).
86 See A Brief History, supra note 56, at endnote 9 (analyzing population figures).
87 On April 18, 2000, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the Many-
beads suit "for want of a necessary and indispensable party, the Hopi tribe," which had "not
waived its sovereign immunity." See Manybeads v. United States, 209 F. 3d 1164, 1165-1166 (9th
Cir. 2000).
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provisions of the AA, which will concern us here: first, HPL Navajos
who agree to sign the AA receive seventy-five year leases to their
homesites, s demarcated in three-acre lots with an additional, though
not necessarily contiguous, ten acres of farmland and beyond that
certain grazing rights to "be regulated pursuant to Hopi Ordinance
43";89 second, the
HPL Navajo signing this agreement and all other persons (minors and
guests) occupying his/her homesite are subject to the jurisdiction of the
[Navajo] Nation and its courts with regard to issues which are entirely
Navajo related, including probate, domestic relations, child custody and
adoption, tribal benefits and services. Otherwise they are subject to the
civil and criminal jurisdiction of the Hopi Tribe and the Hopi Tribal
Court while they reside on the HPL.9°
Given that land is the basis of Native sovereignty, the historical tra-
jectory of the Land Dispute has subverted the sovereignty of the Na-
vajos who were living on what became the 1882 Reservation. As we
have seen, following an historic pattern, the federal government
achieved this subversion by first translating Indian common land into
federal property (in the form of the 1882 reservation), then dividing
that federal property in 1977 so that thousands of Navajos were even-
tually removed from traditional lands that became part of the Hopi
reservation by congressional mandate and court order; and lastly, in
an attempted accommodation between the Hopi Tribe and the few
thousand Navajos who remained on the HPL, by translating the al-
ready translated Navajo traditional lands into rental property for sev-
enty-five years, at which time any party to the agreement can termi-
nate it.9" While the HPL Navajos have certainly maintained their
tribal sovereignty as part of the Navajo Nation, the limits of this sov-
ereignty and its radical difference from that Native sovereignty of pre-
contact origin invoked by Martinez92 has certainly been made clear by
the Land Dispute.
Simply put, as I have argued in the first part of this essay, what we
might term Native, indigenous, or traditional sovereignty, which is
neither tribally nor nationally located but rather kin-based, 93 is sub-
sumed in this case (as it is in the post-contact era), by that sovereignty
generated within the legal vocabularies of Western nation-states. It is
this subversion of traditional sovereignty by a tribal sovereignty gen-
erated within the colonial context that leads grassroots groups such
88 See The Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute Settlement Act of 1996, supra note 84.
89 Accommodation Agreement, §§ A, B, and C.
90 Id. at § E(1).
91 Id. at § E(2).
W See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71-72 (1978); see also supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
93 SeeHealing vJones, 210 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ariz. 1962).
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as the HPL Navajos in the Manybeads case to invoke a language of in-
dividual rights (in this case the right to freedom of religion) in order
to assert their traditional sovereignty. Thus, from the perspective of
tribal councils opposing traditional grassroots movements, the lan-
guage of sovereignty and the language of rights may be opposed, as it
is in the progeny of Talton. Yet from the perspective of grassroots re-
sistors these two languages are one, as we have read in the public
statements of the Grass Roots Oyate?4
If in the first instance the traditional sovereignty of the HPL Nava-
jos is radically compromised by the federally generated dispute be-
tween two tribal sovereignties, Hopi and Navajo, in the second in-
stance, HPL Navajo sovereignty is further compromised by the
jurisdictional outcome of the Dispute noted above, in which the HPL
Navajos find themselves caught between two tribal jurisdictions with-
out representation on the councils of either tribe. While HPL Nava-
jos have representation as individuals in the Chapters (Navajo Nation
voting districts) that border their homes on the HPL, they have no
representation on the Navajo Nation Council as a traditional sovereign
community with a unique history and a set of needs arising from that
history. In addition, they have no representation whatsoever on the
Hopi tribal council, though they are subject to Hopi civil and crimi-
nal law, as outlined above.95 Thus whether we talk in terms of Native
or Western sovereignty, the HPL Navajos have been displaced by fed-
eral Indian law to a jurisdiction that is beyond the bounds of their
sovereign rights.
I suggest it .is the colonial history of this jurisdiction, in which sov-
ereignty and civil rights are simultaneously opposed and synonymous,
that ought to be the subject matter of the progeny of Talton.
9 See Official Proclamation, supra note 26.
9 See "A Statement and Request from Non-Signers of the Accommodation Agreement" (Oc-
tober 28, 1999 through December 7, 1999) to The Navajo-Nation, and Navajo-Hopi Work
Group (this document was faxed to me by community organizers on Big Mountain on Feb. 15,
2000) (on file with author):
H.P.L. Dineh have no direct representation in the Navajo Nation. Because of the unique
political and legal status of HPL residents, the Chapter Houses are unable to serve this
purpose. We are expected to live under the jurisdiction of the Hopi Tribe and be sub-
jected to all the laws they create, yet we are denied any representation in the Hopi Tribe.
"Non-signers" are a relatively small group of the remaining 2,000-3,000 HPL Navajos, who have
refused to sign an AA because of their traditional convictions. See also A Brief History, supra note
56, at 268-69.
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